On the occasion of a video – among other similar ones
– circulated on the internet regarding the problem of game theory, known as
"the prisoner’s dilemma", an attempt to explain the problem is
summarised below, but, moreover, a proposal to extend it, is also attempted
towards the implementation of its forecasts, on international relations
strategies.
The
dilemma (= option of a dual trait), described in the video, is in fact a
paradox of analytical calculus, in terms of the conducive part of the analysis,
i.e. the decision-making. So, what have we got here? Two individuals, each with
personal interests, ultimately (as we usually say at the end of the day) do not
achieve the best for them. So they do not succeed it, as they choose, each for
themselves, their own salvation and the burden of the other. The result is that
they are both in a worse situation than they would have found if they cooperated
in the decision-making process! That is to say, the game theory (i.e., optimal
decision of independent players participating in a backdrop with various
strategic options) of an amended version.
Well, the
theoretical approach is good, an approach of numerical analysis – in a broad
sense – as we put it above, but it might be appropriate to be more practical.
In this
light, on the most practical view, we could extend the (numerical) analysis of
an amended model of the problem in question, i.e. the 'prisoner dilemma' and
start discussing a realistic approach to a similar problem, of another level:
the 'problem of international cooperation'.
States
are by definition the players of the international political scene.
Consequently, each state, in a role of that kind, aims to profit over the
others regardless of its willingness/preference to cooperate (or not). In the
conventional "prisoner's dilemma" the analysis does not go into the
players' expected gains according to their preferences or the potential/capacity
of the players in impeding (vetoing) international cooperation. This is
precisely where the conventional problem of the "prisoner’s dilemma"
needs the above mentioned amendment, so that its analysis also provides for the
preferences of the players-states gains and the profits that correspond to them
regarding the management of impeding (or not) the so-called international
cooperation.
A typical
example of the implementation of this latest case of play (i.e. the management
of international cooperation) is, nowadays, the movements of some leaders such
as the President of the US, D. Trump
(see refusal to participate in international cooperation on various issues,
such as climate change, international trade and business deals, etc.), French
President E. Macron (see moves in the opposite of the "player" Trump’s
moves, which contribute to international cooperation on the aforementioned
issues or even more, discovering, highlighting and throwing at the table of the
international game new issues of international cooperation, etc.). Other
international leaders, representing players-states of a smaller scope, are
working on some similar moves, such as our well-known and non-exceptional Turkish
R T Erdogan, who in the early period of his career "played" by
promoting international cooperation while later on and still at the current
juncture "playing" on the contrary, i.e. with the so-called "adverse"
options, blocking international cooperation even within some by definition
international cooperative organisations (see NATO, OSCE, etc.).
On the
basis of the above analysis of both the conventional standard of the
"prisoner’s dilemma" and its proposed amendment/expansion into
international relations between states-players, it is obvious that, the
application – at least if not the theoretical numerical analysis of the model
too – of the amendment/extension of the model into international relations,
which we here proudly and urgently attempt to explain, has long been
discovered/analysed by the advisors and/or some strategic analysis think tanks,
which support the aforementioned leaders and not only those. And, of course,
the leaders have not taken away the opportunity to move forward with the
implementation!
